Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path
The following analytic detects the loading of new Kernel Mode Drivers from non-standard paths using Windows EventCode 7045. It identifies drivers not located in typical directories like Windows, Program Files, or SystemRoot. This activity is significant because adversaries may use these non-standard paths to load malicious or vulnerable drivers, potentially bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code at the kernel level, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
Known false positives
- False positives may be present based on legitimate third party applications needing to install drivers. Filter, or allow list known good drivers consistently being installed in these paths.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045: A service was installed in the system. |
Rule body
name: Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path
id: 9216ef3d-066a-4958-8f27-c84589465e62
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-05-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the loading of new Kernel Mode Drivers from non-standard paths using Windows EventCode 7045. It identifies drivers not located in typical directories like Windows, Program Files, or SystemRoot. This activity is significant because adversaries may use these non-standard paths to load malicious or vulnerable drivers, potentially bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code at the kernel level, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log System 7045
search: >-
`wineventlog_system`
EventCode = 7045
ServiceType = "kernel mode driver"
| regex ImagePath != "(?i)^(\w:\\\\Program Files\\\\|\w:\\\\Program Files \(x86\)\\\\|\w:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\|\w:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\|\w:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Definition Updates\\\\|\w:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\|%SystemRoot%|\\\\SystemRoot\\\\|SystemRoot\\\\)"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by
Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType
| rename Computer as dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_driver_load_non_standard_path_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To implement this analytic, the Windows EventCode 7045 will need to be logged.
The Windows TA for Splunk is also recommended.
known_false_positives: |
False positives may be present based on legitimate third party applications needing to install drivers.
Filter, or allow list known good drivers consistently being installed in these paths.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
- https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/28.html
finding:
title: A kernel mode driver was loaded from a non-standard path on $dest$.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Windows Drivers
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
- BlackSuit Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1014
- T1068
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_system` EventCode = 7045 ServiceType = "kernel mode driver"
Stage 2: regex
| regex ImagePath != "(?i)^(\w:\\\\Program Files\\\\|\w:\\\\Program Files \(x86\)\\\\|\w:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\|\w:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\|\w:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Definition Updates\\\\|\w:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\|%SystemRoot%|\\\\SystemRoot\\\\|SystemRoot\\\\)"
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by
Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType
Stage 4: rename
| rename Computer as dest
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_driver_load_non_standard_path_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ImagePath | regex_match | "(?i)^(\w:\\Program Files\\|\w:\\Program Files (x86)\\|\w:\\Windows\\System32\\|\w:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\|\w:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Definition Updates\\|\w:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\|%SystemRoot%|\\SystemRoot\\|SystemRoot\\)" | excludes:ImagePath |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7045" |
ServiceType | eq |
| field:"ServiceType" kind:eq |