Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature
The following analytic identifies all drivers being loaded on Windows systems using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). It leverages fields such as driver path, signature status, and hash to detect potentially suspicious drivers. This activity is significant for a SOC as malicious drivers can be used to gain kernel-level access, bypass security controls, or persist in the environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to severe system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
| Stealth | T1014 Rootkit |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 6 | Driver loaded |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature
id: d2d4af6a-6c2b-4d79-80c5-fc2cf12a2f68
version: 8
creation_date: '2022-04-04'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies all drivers being loaded on Windows systems using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). It leverages fields such as driver path, signature status, and hash to detect potentially suspicious drivers. This activity is significant for a SOC as malicious drivers can be used to gain kernel-level access, bypass security controls, or persist in the environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to severe system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 6
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=6
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY ImageLoaded dest dvc
process_hash process_path signature
signature_id user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have the latest version of the Sysmon TA. Most EDR products provide the ability to review driver loads, or module loads, and using a query as such help with hunting for malicious drivers.
known_false_positives: This analytic is meant to assist with identifying and hunting drivers loaded in the environment.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/
- https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/28.html
analytic_story:
- Windows Drivers
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1014
- T1068
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1014/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=6
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY ImageLoaded dest dvc
process_hash process_path signature
signature_id user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|