Detection rules › Splunk

Windows EDRSilencer Execution

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
CurrentDirectory, IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

Detects the usage of EDRSilencer. Inspired by the closed-source FireBlock tool from MdSec NightHawk, this custom tool was developed to block outbound traffic of running Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) processes using Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) APIs. Its features include searching for running EDR processes and applying WFP filters to block outbound traffic, adding filters for specific processes, and removing filters either individually or globally. The tool includes a custom implementation to avoid file handle access issues with EDR processes by bypassing the CreateFileW API. It supports a wide range of EDRs, including Microsoft Defender, Carbon Black, SentinelOne, and more, though further testing on various EDRs is recommended. The tool has been tested on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, and its usage involves simple commands for blocking or unblocking traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense ImpairmentT1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows EDRSilencer Execution
id: a206324d-4945-4b0c-a731-87c311ddae2f
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    Detects the usage of EDRSilencer.
    Inspired by the closed-source FireBlock tool from MdSec NightHawk, this custom tool was developed to block outbound traffic of running Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) processes using Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) APIs.
    Its features include searching for running EDR processes and applying WFP filters to block outbound traffic, adding filters for specific processes, and removing filters either individually or globally.
    The tool includes a custom implementation to avoid file handle access issues with EDR processes by bypassing the CreateFileW API.
    It supports a wide range of EDRs, including Microsoft Defender, Carbon Black, SentinelOne, and more, though further testing on various EDRs is recommended.
    The tool has been tested on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, and its usage involves simple commands for blocking or unblocking traffic.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.process_name="EDRSilencer.exe"
    OR
    (
        Processes.process="*blockedr *"
        NOT Processes.process="*blockedreport*"
    )
    
    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
       Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_edrsilencer_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Some legitimate administrative tools or security workflows may use similar techniques to block or filter EDR traffic for maintenance or troubleshooting. Verify the context and authorized use before flagging.
references:
    - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
drilldown_searches:
    - earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
      name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Potential EDRSilencer execution observed on $dest$ via $process$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Security Solution Tampering
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562/snapattack/snapattack.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process_name="EDRSilencer.exe"
OR
(
    Processes.process="*blockedr *"
    NOT Processes.process="*blockedreport*"
)

by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
   Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_edrsilencer_execution_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.processeq
  • "*blockedr *"
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "EDRSilencer.exe"