Windows EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities

name: Windows EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
id: dc167f8b-3f9d-4460-9c98-8b6e703fd628
version: 7
creation_date: '2025-04-24'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    This analytic detects EventLog reconnaissance activity using utilities such as `wevtutil.exe`, `wmic.exe`, PowerShell cmdlets like `Get-WinEvent`, or WMI queries targeting `Win32_NTLogEvent`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. These tools are often used by adversaries to extract usernames, IP addresses, session data, and event information for credential access or situational awareness during lateral movement. While these utilities are legitimate, execution with specific arguments or targeting sensitive logs like `Security`, `PowerShell`, or specific EventIDs (e.g., 4624, 4778) can indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive info and potentially have leveraged access or move laterally.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
      min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      where (
        (
          (
            Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
            OR
            Processes.original_file_name IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.EXE")
          )
          Processes.process IN ("*Get-WinEvent*", "*Get-EventLog*", "*EventLogQuery*", "*.ReadEvent(*")
        )
        OR
        (
          (
            Processes.process_name = wevtutil.exe
            OR
            Processes.original_file_name = wevtutil.exe
          )
          Processes.process IN ("* qe *", "* query-events *")
        )
        OR
        (
          (
            Processes.process_name = wmic.exe
            OR
            Processes.original_file_name = wmic.exe
          )
          Processes.process IN ("*ntevent*")
        )
        OR
        (
          Processes.process="*Win32_NTLogEvent*"
          Processes.process="*EventCode*"
        )
        OR
        (
          Processes.process IN ("*PsLogList*", "*Eventquery*")
        )
      )
      by
        Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
        Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
        Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
        Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
        Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_eventlog_recon_activity_using_log_query_utilities_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
    and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
    telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
    you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
    be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
    the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
    data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
    names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    System administrators or monitoring tools may legitimately use these utilities to gather logs for troubleshooting or auditing. Filter known admin behavior or monitoring solutions as needed.
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Suspicious log query $process$ command was run on $dest$ by $user$
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: Suspicious log query $process$ command was run on $dest$ by $user$
analytic_story:
    - Windows Discovery Techniques
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1654
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint