Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Executable in Loaded Modules

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Signed, dest, image_loaded, original_file_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies instances where executable files (.exe) are loaded as modules, detected through 'ImageLoaded' events in Sysmon logs. This method leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to track unusual module loading behavior, which is significant as it deviates from the norm of loading .dll files. This activity is crucial for SOC monitoring because it can indicate the presence of malware like NjRAT, which uses this technique to load malicious modules. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the host system.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule body

name: Windows Executable in Loaded Modules
id: 3e27af56-fcf0-4113-988d-24969b062be7
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-09-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies instances where executable files (.exe) are loaded as modules, detected through 'ImageLoaded' events in Sysmon logs. This method leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to track unusual module loading behavior, which is significant as it deviates from the norm of loading .dll files. This activity is crucial for SOC monitoring because it can indicate the presence of malware like NjRAT, which uses this technique to load malicious modules. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the host system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: |-
    `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded != *.dll AND Signed != true
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY Image ImageLoaded dest
           loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name
           process_exec process_guid process_hash
           process_id process_name process_path
           service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature
           Signed signature_id user_id
           vendor_product
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_executable_in_loaded_modules_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat
finding:
    title: An executable $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - NjRAT
    - Lokibot
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1129
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded != *.dll AND Signed != true

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY Image ImageLoaded dest
       loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name
       process_exec process_guid process_hash
       process_id process_name process_path
       service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature
       Signed signature_id user_id
       vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_executable_in_loaded_modules_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.