Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects arbitrary command execution using Windows msdt.exe, a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify instances where msdt.exe is invoked via the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to retrieve a remote payload. This activity is significant as it can indicate an exploitation attempt leveraging msdt.exe to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT
id: e1d5145f-38fe-42b9-a5d5-457796715f97
version: 15
creation_date: '2022-05-30'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects arbitrary command execution using Windows msdt.exe, a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify instances where msdt.exe is invoked via the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to retrieve a remote payload. This activity is significant as it can indicate an exploitation attempt leveraging msdt.exe to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process IN ("*msdt*","*ms-msdt:*","*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*")
        AND
        (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*"
        OR
        Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*"
        OR
        Processes.process="*.xml*")
        AND
        Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*"
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter as needed. Added .xml to potentially capture any answer file usage. Remove as needed.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20&t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A parent process $parent_process_name$ has spawned a child process $process_name$ on host $dest$ possibly indicative of indirect command execution.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2022-30190
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/msdt.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process IN ("*msdt*","*ms-msdt:*","*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*")
    AND
    (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*"
    OR
    Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*"
    OR
    Processes.process="*.xml*")
    AND
    Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*"
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.processeq
  • "*.xml*" corpus 6 (sigma 4, splunk 2)
  • "*IT_BrowseForFile=*" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • "*IT_RebrowseForFile=*"
  • "*PCWDiagnostic*"
Processes.processin
  • "*/id*"
  • "*ms-msdt:*"
  • "*ms-msdt:-id*"
  • "*ms-msdt:/id*"
  • "*msdt*"
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "msdt.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 6, splunk 2)