Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior.

Known false positives

  • A possible false positive (FP) for the execution of .msc files is legitimate administrative activity, since .msc files are standard Microsoft Management Console snap-ins used for system administration.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path
id: ac30858b-7c25-4f0a-a7fa-bef036e49dc3
version: 5
creation_date: '2021-07-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe)
    AND Processes.process = "*.msc*"
    AND Processes.process IN (
      "*\\PerfLogs\\*",
      "*\\programdata\\*"
      "*Recycle.bin*",
      "*\\Download*",
      "*\\temp\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Default\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
      "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
      "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*",
      "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
      )
    AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))
    
    by Processes.action
    Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
    Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
    Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
    Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
    Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: A possible false positive (FP) for the execution of .msc files is legitimate administrative activity, since .msc files are standard Microsoft Management Console snap-ins used for system administration.
references:
    - https://www.securonix.com/blog/analyzing-fluxconsole-using-tax-themed-lures-threat-actors-exploit-windows-management-console-to-deliver-backdoor-payloads/
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A Microsoft Management Console process [ $process_name$ ] launched an .msc file [ $process$ ] on the target system [ $dest$ ].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - XML Runner Loader
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.014
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe)
AND Processes.process = "*.msc*"
AND Processes.process IN (
  "*\\PerfLogs\\*",
  "*\\programdata\\*"
  "*Recycle.bin*",
  "*\\Download*",
  "*\\temp\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Default\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
  "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*",
  "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
  )
AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))

by Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.processin"*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*"excludes:Processes.process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.processeq
  • "*.msc*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*"
  • "*Recycle.bin*"
  • "*\\Download*"
  • "*\\PerfLogs\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Default\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Public\\*" corpus 2 (chronicle 2)
  • "*\\programdata\\*"
  • "*\\temp\\*" corpus 2 (chronicle 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "mmc.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 7, splunk 5)
field:"process_name" kind:eq