Detection rules › Splunk

Windows FFmpeg Audio and Video Device Discovery

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic detects the use of FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) to enumerate connected audio and video devices on a Windows endpoint. Adversaries and stealers such as SalatStealer abuse FFmpeg's DirectShow (dshow) input interface by invoking it with the -list_devices true and -hide_banner flags from a temporary directory, allowing them to silently discover available webcams, microphones, and capture cards without triggering obvious user-facing activity. Device discovery of this kind maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where threat actors profile the system's multimedia capabilities as a precursor to covert audio or video surveillance. The combination of an unusual process path (temp), the dshow input filter, and the device-listing arguments is a strong indicator of malicious reconnaissance rather than legitimate administrative use.

Known false positives

  • Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Collection

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows FFmpeg Audio and Video Device Discovery
id: 6394c389-3863-4677-bcbd-07d1519b34d2
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-20'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic detects the use of FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) to enumerate connected audio and video devices on a Windows endpoint. Adversaries and stealers such as SalatStealer abuse FFmpeg's DirectShow (dshow) input interface by invoking it with the -list_devices true and -hide_banner flags from a temporary directory, allowing them to silently discover available webcams, microphones, and capture cards without triggering obvious user-facing activity. Device discovery of this kind maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where threat actors profile the system's multimedia capabilities as a precursor to covert audio or video surveillance. The combination of an unusual process path (temp), the dshow input filter, and the device-listing arguments is a strong indicator of malicious reconnaissance rather than legitimate administrative use.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
              (
                Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
                Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
               ) AND
    
              Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
              Processes.process = "*-list_devices*" AND
              Processes.process = "*-hide_banner*" AND
              Processes.process = "* dshow *"
            )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_ffmpeg_audio_and_video_device_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/uac-0252-activity-delivering-shadowsniff-and-salatstealer-malware
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/SalatStealer/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a ffmpeg.exe process [$process_path$] list video and audio devices on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1125
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE (
          (
            Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
            Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
           ) AND

          Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
          Processes.process = "*-list_devices*" AND
          Processes.process = "*-hide_banner*" AND
          Processes.process = "* dshow *"
        )
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_ffmpeg_audio_and_video_device_discovery_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "ffmpeg.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "* dshow *" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
  • "*-hide_banner*"
  • "*-list_devices*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "ffmpeg.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"process_name" kind:eq
Processes.process_pathin
  • "*\\temp\\*" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"Image" kind:in