Detection rules › Splunk
Windows FFmpeg DirectShow Video Capture
This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns. After enumerating available devices, threat actors invoke FFmpeg with a specific video capture command that references a named webcam device (video=), requests MJPEG encoding (mjpeg), and uses the dshow input filter — all from a temporary directory to reduce forensic footprint. This sequence moves beyond reconnaissance into active collection, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where adversaries silently record from the victim's webcam to gather intelligence or capture sensitive on-screen activity. The presence of ffmpeg.exe in a temp path combined with these DirectShow video arguments is highly anomalous outside of dedicated multimedia or screen-recording software, making it a strong signal of covert surveillance activity.
Known false positives
- Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Collection |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: Windows FFmpeg DirectShow Video Capture
id: 636f1a0b-562a-4629-80f6-5ad46d2ebdee
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-20'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns. After enumerating available devices, threat actors invoke FFmpeg with a specific video capture command that references a named webcam device (video=), requests MJPEG encoding (mjpeg), and uses the dshow input filter — all from a temporary directory to reduce forensic footprint. This sequence moves beyond reconnaissance into active collection, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where adversaries silently record from the victim's webcam to gather intelligence or capture sensitive on-screen activity. The presence of ffmpeg.exe in a temp path combined with these DirectShow video arguments is highly anomalous outside of dedicated multimedia or screen-recording software, making it a strong signal of covert surveillance activity.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
(
Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
) AND
Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
Processes.process = "*video=*" AND
Processes.process = "* mjpeg *" AND
Processes.process = "* dshow *"
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_ffmpeg_directshow_video_capture_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/uac-0252-activity-delivering-shadowsniff-and-salatstealer-malware
- https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/SalatStealer/
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: a ffmpeg.exe process [$process_path$] capture video using DirectShow on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
- field: process
type: process
analytic_story:
- Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1125
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
(
Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
) AND
Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
Processes.process = "*video=*" AND
Processes.process = "* mjpeg *" AND
Processes.process = "* dshow *"
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_ffmpeg_directshow_video_capture_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.original_file_name | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq |
Processes.process | eq |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:eq |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |
Processes.process_path | in |
| field:"Image" kind:in |