Detection rules › Splunk
Windows File and Directory Permissions Enable Inheritance
The following analytic detects the enabling of permission inheritance using ICACLS. This analytic identifies instances where ICACLS commands are used to enable permission inheritance on files or directories. The /inheritance:e flag, which restores inherited permissions from a parent directory, is monitored to detect changes that might reapply broader access control settings. Enabling inheritance can indicate legitimate administrative actions but may also signal attempts to override restrictive custom permissions, potentially exposing sensitive files to unauthorized access.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment | T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows File and Directory Permissions Enable Inheritance
id: 0247f90a-aca4-47b2-a94d-e30f445d7b41
version: 7
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the enabling of permission inheritance using ICACLS. This analytic identifies instances where ICACLS commands are used to enable permission inheritance on files or directories. The /inheritance:e flag, which restores inherited permissions from a parent directory, is monitored to detect changes that might reapply broader access control settings. Enabling inheritance can indicate legitimate administrative actions but may also signal attempts to override restrictive custom permissions, potentially exposing sensitive files to unauthorized access.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name IN( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe")
AND
Processes.process = "*/inheritance:e*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_file_and_directory_permissions_enable_inheritance_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/-applocker-rules-as-defense-evasion-complete-analysis.html
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
analytic_story:
- Crypto Stealer
- NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1222.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/icacls_inheritance/icacls_process_1.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name IN( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe")
AND
Processes.process = "*/inheritance:e*"
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_file_and_directory_permissions_enable_inheritance_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
|
Processes.process_name | in |
|