Detection rules › Splunk

Windows File Download Via CertUtil

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of certutil.exe to download files using the -URL, -urlcache or '-verifyctl' arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because certutil.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.

Known false positives

  • Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows File Download Via CertUtil
id: 7fac8d40-e370-45ea-a4a3-031bbcc18b02
version: 7
creation_date: '2021-03-24'
modification_date: '2026-07-14'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `certutil.exe` to download files using the `-URL`, `-urlcache` or '-verifyctl' arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because `certutil.exe` is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_certutil`
        AND
        ((Processes.process IN ("*-URL *", "*/URL *"))
        OR
        (Processes.process IN ("*urlcache*", "*verifyctl*")
        AND
        Processes.process IN ("*/f *", "*-f *")))
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_file_download_via_certutil_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/
    - https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210921110637/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl
finding:
    title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Living Off The Land
    - Ingress Tool Transfer
    - ProxyNotShell
    - DarkSide Ransomware
    - Forest Blizzard
    - Flax Typhoon
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - CISA AA22-277A
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1105
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE `process_certutil`
    AND
    ((Processes.process IN ("*-URL *", "*/URL *"))
    OR
    (Processes.process IN ("*urlcache*", "*verifyctl*")
    AND
    Processes.process IN ("*/f *", "*-f *")))
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_file_download_via_certutil_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "CertUtil.exe" corpus 30 (sigma 14, elastic 10, splunk 6)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*-URL *"
  • "*-f *" corpus 3 (splunk 2, sigma 1)
  • "*/URL *"
  • "*/f *" corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • "*urlcache*" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • "*verifyctl*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "certutil.exe" corpus 44 (elastic 38, splunk 6)
field:"process_name" kind:eq