Detection rules › Splunk
Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder
This analytic detects the creation of files without extensions in critical Windows system and driver-related directories, including but not limited to System32\Drivers, and other known Windows driver storage and loading paths. The analytic leverages telemetry from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, with a focus on file creation events and file path analysis. File creation activity in these directories—particularly involving extensionless files—is highly suspicious, as it may indicate the presence of destructive or stealthy malware. This behavior is consistent with malware families such as HermeticWiper, which deploy kernel driver components into trusted Windows driver directories to obtain low-level access and execute destructive payloads. If confirmed malicious, this activity can result in severe system compromise, including the deployment of malicious drivers, boot-sector or filesystem destruction, and ultimately system inoperability and irreversible data loss.
Known false positives
- If you are leveraging Sysmon, you may see false positives related to folder creation, since Event ID 11 does not contain enough information to determine if the file is a File or a Directory. Filter out those entries when leveraging this analytic.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Impact |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule body
name: Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder
id: 0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-02-25'
modification_date: '2026-07-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
This analytic detects the creation of files without extensions in critical Windows system and driver-related directories, including but not limited to System32\Drivers, and other known Windows driver storage and loading paths.
The analytic leverages telemetry from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, with a focus on file creation events and file path analysis.
File creation activity in these directories—particularly involving extensionless files—is highly suspicious, as it may indicate the presence of destructive or stealthy malware.
This behavior is consistent with malware families such as HermeticWiper, which deploy kernel driver components into trusted Windows driver directories to obtain low-level access and execute destructive payloads.
If confirmed malicious, this activity can result in severe system compromise, including the deployment of malicious drivers, boot-sector or filesystem destruction, and ultimately system inoperability and irreversible data loss.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where
Filesystem.action IN ("created", "modified")
Filesystem.file_path IN(
"*:\\AMD\\*",
"*:\\OEM\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\Boot\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\ELAMBKUP\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\INF\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Boot\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Recovery\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Drivers\\*"
)
by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time
Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| rex field="file_name" "\.(?<extension>[^\.]*$)"
| where isnull(extension)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
known_false_positives: |-
If you are leveraging Sysmon, you may see false positives related to folder creation, since Event ID 11 does not contain enough information to determine if the file is a File or a Directory. Filter out those entries when leveraging this analytic.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/2184241/where-does-windows-installation-search-for-drivers
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: A file without extension [$file_name$] was dropped in a critical folder [$file_path$] by $user$
threat_objects:
- field: file_name
type: file_name
analytic_story:
- Data Destruction
- Hermetic Wiper
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where
Filesystem.action IN ("created", "modified")
Filesystem.file_path IN(
"*:\\AMD\\*",
"*:\\OEM\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\Boot\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\ELAMBKUP\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\INF\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Boot\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\Recovery\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Drivers\\*"
)
by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time
Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
Stage 3: rex
| rex field="file_name" "\.(?<extension>[^\.]*$)"
Stage 4: where
| where isnull(extension)
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Filesystem.action | in |
| field:"event_action" kind:in |
Filesystem.file_path | in |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:in |
extension | is_null | field:"extension" kind:is_null |