Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Global Object Access Audit List Cleared Via Auditpol

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies the execution of auditpol.exe with the "/resourceSACL" flag, and either the "/clear" or "/remove" command-line arguments used to remove or clear the global object access audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.

Known false positives

  • False positives should be rare to non existent. Any activity detected by this analytic should be investigated and approved or denied.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Global Object Access Audit List Cleared Via Auditpol
id: 802a0930-0a4a-4451-bf6c-6366c6b6d9e7
version: 8
creation_date: '2025-02-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/resourceSACL" flag, and either the "/clear" or "/remove" command-line arguments used to remove or clear the global object access audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_auditpol` Processes.process="*/resourceSACL*" Processes.process IN ("*/clear*", "*/remove*")
        AND
        NOT Processes.process="*/?*"
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_global_object_access_audit_list_cleared_via_auditpol_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process name, and process original file name. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be rare to non existent. Any activity detected by this analytic should be investigated and approved or denied.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol-resourcesacl
finding:
    title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to clear the global object access audit policy on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to clear the global object access audit policy on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows Audit Policy Tampering
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE `process_auditpol` Processes.process="*/resourceSACL*" Processes.process IN ("*/clear*", "*/remove*")
    AND
    NOT Processes.process="*/?*"
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_global_object_access_audit_list_cleared_via_auditpol_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.processeq"*/?*"excludes:Processes.process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "AUDITPOL.EXE" corpus 10 (splunk 8, sigma 1, elastic 1)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "*/resourceSACL*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*/clear*"
  • "*/remove*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "auditpol.exe" corpus 10 (splunk 8, elastic 2)
field:"process_name" kind:eq