Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Group Policy Object Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
| Persistence | T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
| Privilege Escalation | T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts, T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
| Stealth | T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
| Defense Impairment | T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5137 | A directory service object was created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Group Policy Object Created
id: 23add2a8-ea22-4fd4-8bc0-8c0b822373a1
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-03-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new Group Policy Object (GPO) by leveraging Event IDs 5136 and 5137. This detection uses directory service change events to identify when a new GPO is created. Monitoring GPO creation is crucial as adversaries can exploit GPOs to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control system configurations, deploy ransomware, or propagate malware, leading to widespread compromise and significant operational disruption.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5136
- Windows Event Log Security 5137
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!="New Group Policy Object" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer
| stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN
BY ObjectGUID Computer dest
| eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0)
| eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1)
| fields - details
| `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, the Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Service Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. Furthermore, the appropriate system access control lists (SACL) need to be created as the used events are not logged by default. A good guide to accomplish this can be found here https://jgspiers.com/audit-group-policy-changes/.
known_false_positives: Group Policy Objects are created as part of regular administrative operations, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockbit-ransomware-now-encrypts-windows-domains-using-group-policies/
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/group-policy-objects
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$User$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search User = "$User$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$User$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$User$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: A new group policy objected was created by $User$
entity:
field: User
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078.002
- T1484.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/group_policy_created/windows-security.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!="New Group Policy Object" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer
Stage 2: stats
| stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN
BY ObjectGUID Computer dest
Stage 3: eval
| eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0)
Stage 4: eval
| eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1)
Stage 5: fields
| fields - details
Stage 6: search
| `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AttributeLDAPDisplayName | eq |
|
AttributeValue | ne |
|
EventCode | eq |
|
ObjectClass | eq |
|