Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass
The following analytic identifies processes attempting to access Lsass.exe, which may indicate credential dumping or applications needing credential access. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to detect such activities by analyzing fields like TargetImage, GrantedAccess, and SourceImage. This behavior is significant as unauthorized access to Lsass.exe can lead to credential theft, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10 | ProcessAccess |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass
id: 1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-01-11'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies processes attempting to access Lsass.exe, which may indicate credential dumping or applications needing credential access. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 to detect such activities by analyzing fields like TargetImage, GrantedAccess, and SourceImage. This behavior is significant as unauthorized access to Lsass.exe can lead to credential theft, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 10
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess
Guid Opcode ProcessID
SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID
SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID
TargetProcessId UserID dest
granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path
process_exec process_guid process_id
process_name process_path signature
signature_id user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.
known_false_positives: False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. Utilize this hunting analytic to tune out false positives in TTP or anomaly analytics.
references:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
analytic_story:
- CISA AA23-347A
- Credential Dumping
- Lokibot
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess
Guid Opcode ProcessID
SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID
SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID
TargetProcessId UserID dest
granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path
process_exec process_guid process_id
process_name process_path signature
signature_id user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
TargetImage | eq |
|