Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS
Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.
Known false positives
- Creating a DNS entry matching this pattern is very unusual in a production environment. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | |
| Collection | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS
id: 9029b575-6f6b-4ab1-b660-67b24b7e9c3d
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-11-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4662
- Windows Event Log Security 5136
- Windows Event Log Security 5137
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))
| eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))
| eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)
| stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
BY Object
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes `4662`, `5136`, `5137`. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Services Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
known_false_positives: Creating a DNS entry matching this pattern is very unusual in a production environment. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
finding:
title: A possible Kerberos coercion DNS object was created $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A possible Kerberos coercion DNS object was created $dest$
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Suspicious DNS Traffic
- Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
- Kerberos Coercion with DNS
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2025-33073
mitre_attack_id:
- T1071.004
- T1557.001
- T1187
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))
Stage 2: eval
| eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))
Stage 3: eval
| eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)
Stage 4: stats
| stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
BY Object
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
AdditionalInfo | eq |
| field:"AdditionalInfo" kind:eq |
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
ObjectClass | eq |
| field:"ObjectClass" kind:eq |
ObjectDN | eq |
| field:"ObjectDN" kind:eq |