Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
SourcePort, action, app, authentication_method, command_line, dest, dvc, process_id, process_name, signature, signature_id, src, status, subject, user, user_group, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. It detects EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and source address 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account. This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon
id: 8309c3a8-4d34-48ae-ad66-631658214653
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-04-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. It detects EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and source address 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account. This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4624
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName=Kerberos action=success src=127.0.0.1
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY action app authentication_method
           dest dvc process
           process_id process_name process_path
           signature signature_id src
           src_port status subject
           user user_group vendor_product
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4624 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible, filtering may be required to restrict to workstations vs domain controllers. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A successful localhost Kerberos authentication event occurred on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1558
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558/windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName=Kerberos action=success src=127.0.0.1

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY action app authentication_method
       dest dvc process
       process_id process_name process_path
       signature signature_id src
       src_port status subject
       user user_group vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
AuthenticationPackageNameeq
  • Kerberos corpus 5 (sigma 2, elastic 2, splunk 1)
EventCodeeq
  • 4624 corpus 25 (splunk 13, kusto 8, chronicle 4)
LogonTypeeq
  • 3 corpus 40 (splunk 13, sigma 12, elastic 9, kusto 6)
actioneq
  • success corpus 3 (splunk 3)
srceq
  • 127.0.0.1