Detection rules › Splunk

Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
ImagePath, ServiceType, StartType, dest, service_name, signature_id
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of a service with the default name "KrbSCM" associated with the KrbRelayUp tool. It leverages Windows System Event Logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as KrbRelayUp is a known tool used for privilege escalation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Known false positives

  • False positives should be limited as this is specific to KrbRelayUp based attack. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation
id: e40ef542-8241-4419-9af4-6324582ea60a
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-05-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a service with the default name "KrbSCM" associated with the KrbRelayUp tool. It leverages Windows System Event Logs, specifically EventCode 7045, to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as KrbRelayUp is a known tool used for privilege escalation attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log System 7045
search: |-
    `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN ("KrbSCM")
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest EventCode ImagePath
           ServiceName StartType ServiceType
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_krbrelayup_service_creation_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System Event Logs with 7045 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is specific to KrbRelayUp based attack. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
finding:
    title: A service was created on $dest$, related to KrbRelayUp.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
    - Compromised Windows Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1543.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN ("KrbSCM")

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest EventCode ImagePath
       ServiceName StartType ServiceType

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_krbrelayup_service_creation_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 7045 corpus 21 (splunk 18, elastic 1, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7045"
ServiceNamein
  • "KrbSCM" corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1)
field:"ServiceName" kind:in