Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing
The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4624 | An account was successfully logged on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4625 | An account failed to log on. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing
id: 09555511-aca6-484a-b6ab-72cd03d73c34
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-03-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4624
- Windows Event Log Security 4625
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator
| bucket span=5m _time
| stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(dest) as dest values(src) as src values(user) as user
BY _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName,
EventCode, action, app,
authentication_method, signature, signature_id
| where unique_targets > 30
| `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/wide-spread-local-admin-testing/
- https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/admin-password-re-use-dont-do-it/
- https://www.praetorian.com/blog/microsofts-local-administrator-password-solution-laps/
- https://wiki.porchetta.industries/smb-protocol/password-spraying
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$host_targets$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search host_targets = "$host_targets$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$host_targets$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$host_targets$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Local Administrator credential stuffing attack coming from $IpAddress$
entity:
field: host_targets
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: IpAddress
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1110.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.004/local_administrator_cred_stuffing/windows-security.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator
Stage 2: bucket
| bucket span=5m _time
Stage 3: stats
| stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(dest) as dest values(src) as src values(user) as user
BY _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName,
EventCode, action, app,
authentication_method, signature, signature_id
Stage 4: where
| where unique_targets > 30
Stage 5: search
| `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
Logon_Type | eq |
|
TargetUserName | eq |
|
unique_targets | gt |
|