Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process
The following analytic identifies instances where explorer.exe is spawned by unusual parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant because explorer.exe is typically initiated by userinit.exe, and deviations from this norm can indicate code injection or process masquerading attempts by malware like Qakbot. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.
Known false positives
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process
id: 61490da9-52a1-4855-a0c5-28233c88c481
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-10-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
The following analytic identifies instances where explorer.exe is spawned by unusual parent processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or regsvr32.exe.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships.
This activity is significant because explorer.exe is typically initiated by userinit.exe, and deviations from this norm can indicate code injection or process masquerading attempts by malware like Qakbot.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, evade detection, and maintain persistence within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name IN (
"cmd.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"regsvr32.exe"
)
Processes.process_name = "explorer.exe"
Processes.process IN ("*\\explorer.exe")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_masquerading_explorer_as_child_process_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.qakbot
finding:
title: explorer.exe has a suspicious parent process $parent_process_name$ on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Qakbot
- Compromised Windows Host
- Water Gamayun
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1574.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name IN (
"cmd.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"regsvr32.exe"
)
Processes.process_name = "explorer.exe"
Processes.process IN ("*\\explorer.exe")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_masquerading_explorer_as_child_process_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process_name | in |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:in |
Processes.process | in |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:in |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |