Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Modify Registry ValleyRat PWN Reg Entry

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry specifically targeting .pwn file associations related to the ValleyRAT malware. ValleyRAT may create or alter registry entries to associate .pwn files with malicious processes, allowing it to execute harmful scripts or commands when these files are opened. By monitoring for unusual changes in registry keys linked to .pwn extensions, this detection enables security analysts to identify potential ValleyRAT infection attempts. Early detection of these modifications helps mitigate unauthorized execution and prevents further exploitation of the system.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
PersistenceT1112 Modify Registry
Defense ImpairmentT1112 Modify Registry

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 13RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Modify Registry ValleyRat PWN Reg Entry
id: 6947c44e-be1f-4dd9-b198-bc42be5be196
version: 13
creation_date: '2024-09-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry specifically targeting `.pwn` file associations related to the ValleyRAT malware. ValleyRAT may create or alter registry entries to associate `.pwn` files with malicious processes, allowing it to execute harmful scripts or commands when these files are opened. By monitoring for unusual changes in registry keys linked to `.pwn` extensions, this detection enables security analysts to identify potential ValleyRAT infection attempts. Early detection of these modifications helps mitigate unauthorized execution and prevents further exploitation of the system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*.pwn\\Shell\\Open\\command" OR Registry.registry_value_data = ".pwn") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_valleyrat_pwn_reg_entry_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/chinese-malware-appears-earnest-across-cybercrime-threat-landscape
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/valleyrat-campaign-targeting-chinese-speakers
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A possible ValleyRAT Registry modification in [$dest$].
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A possible ValleyRAT Registry modification in [$dest$].
analytic_story:
    - ValleyRAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1112
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/pwn_reg/pwn_reg.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*.pwn\\Shell\\Open\\command" OR Registry.registry_value_data = ".pwn") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_modify_registry_valleyrat_pwn_reg_entry_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Registry.registry_patheq
  • "*.pwn\\Shell\\Open\\command"
Registry.registry_value_dataeq
  • ".pwn"