Detection rules › Splunk

Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command
id: e9d05aa2-32f0-411b-930c-5b8ca5c4fcee
version: 16
creation_date: '2022-06-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands.
    This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process.
    If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe
    
    (
        Processes.process_name IN (
            "arp.exe"
            "dsget.exe",
            "hostname.exe",
            "ipconfig.exe",
            "nbtstat.exe",
            "netdom.exe",
            "nltest.exe",
            "ntdsutil.exe",
            "qprocess.exe",
            "qwinsta.exe",
            "systeminfo.exe"
            "wmic.exe"
        )
        OR
        (
            Processes.process_name IN (
                "bash.exe",
                "cmd.exe",
                "powershell.exe",
                "powershell_ise.exe",
                "pwsh.exe"
            )
    
            (
                Processes.process IN (
                    "*arp *",
                    "*dsget*",
                    "*hostname*",
                    "*ipconfig*",
                    "*nbtstat*",
                    "*netdom*",
                    "*nltest*",
                    "*ntdsutil*",
                    "*qprocess *",
                    "*qwinsta*",
                    "*systeminfo*",
                    "*wmic *"
                )
                OR
                (
                    (
                        Processes.process IN (
                            "*net *",
                            "*net.exe *",
                            "*net1*"
                            "*net1.exe*"
                        )
                        OR
                        Processes.process_name IN (
                            "net.exe",
                            "net1.exe"
                        )
                    )
                    Processes.process = "*view*"
                )
                OR
                (
                    (
                        Processes.process IN (
                            "*reg *",
                            "*reg.exe *"
                            "*sc *",
                            "*sc.exe *",
                        )
                        OR
                        Processes.process_name IN (
                            "reg.exe",
                            "sc.exe"
                        )
                    )
                    Processes.process = "*query*"
                    NOT Processes.process = "* /SC *"
                )
                OR
                (
                    (
                        Processes.process IN (
                            "*query *",
                            "*query.exe*"
                        )
                        OR
                        Processes.process_name = "query.exe"
                    )
                    Processes.process IN (
                        "* process",
                        "* session",
                        "* user",
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    )
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives might still be present, depending on the installer. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 30
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 30
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - Water Gamayun
    - StealC Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.007
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe

(
    Processes.process_name IN (
        "arp.exe"
        "dsget.exe",
        "hostname.exe",
        "ipconfig.exe",
        "nbtstat.exe",
        "netdom.exe",
        "nltest.exe",
        "ntdsutil.exe",
        "qprocess.exe",
        "qwinsta.exe",
        "systeminfo.exe"
        "wmic.exe"
    )
    OR
    (
        Processes.process_name IN (
            "bash.exe",
            "cmd.exe",
            "powershell.exe",
            "powershell_ise.exe",
            "pwsh.exe"
        )

        (
            Processes.process IN (
                "*arp *",
                "*dsget*",
                "*hostname*",
                "*ipconfig*",
                "*nbtstat*",
                "*netdom*",
                "*nltest*",
                "*ntdsutil*",
                "*qprocess *",
                "*qwinsta*",
                "*systeminfo*",
                "*wmic *"
            )
            OR
            (
                (
                    Processes.process IN (
                        "*net *",
                        "*net.exe *",
                        "*net1*"
                        "*net1.exe*"
                    )
                    OR
                    Processes.process_name IN (
                        "net.exe",
                        "net1.exe"
                    )
                )
                Processes.process = "*view*"
            )
            OR
            (
                (
                    Processes.process IN (
                        "*reg *",
                        "*reg.exe *"
                        "*sc *",
                        "*sc.exe *",
                    )
                    OR
                    Processes.process_name IN (
                        "reg.exe",
                        "sc.exe"
                    )
                )
                Processes.process = "*query*"
                NOT Processes.process = "* /SC *"
            )
            OR
            (
                (
                    Processes.process IN (
                        "*query *",
                        "*query.exe*"
                    )
                    OR
                    Processes.process_name = "query.exe"
                )
                Processes.process IN (
                    "* process",
                    "* session",
                    "* user",
                )
            )
        )
    )
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "msiexec.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 4, splunk 3, kusto 2)
Processes.processeq
  • "*query*" corpus 8 (sigma 7, splunk 1)
  • "*view*" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
Processes.processin
  • "* process"
  • "* session"
  • "* user"
  • "*arp *"
  • "*dsget*"
  • "*hostname*" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • "*ipconfig*" corpus 4 (sigma 3, kusto 1)
  • "*nbtstat*"
  • "*net *"
  • "*net.exe *"
  • "*net1*"
  • "*net1.exe*" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • "*netdom*"
  • "*nltest*" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • "*ntdsutil*"
  • "*qprocess *"
  • "*query *"
  • "*query.exe*"
  • "*qwinsta*"
  • "*reg *" corpus 5 (sigma 5)
  • "*reg.exe *"
  • "*sc *"
  • "*sc.exe *"
  • "*systeminfo*" corpus 6 (sigma 4, splunk 1, kusto 1)
  • "*wmic *" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "query.exe" corpus 5 (splunk 3, elastic 2)
Processes.process_namein
  • "arp.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 7, splunk 1)
  • "bash.exe"
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "dsget.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "hostname.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "ipconfig.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 7, splunk 1)
  • "nbtstat.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 8)
  • "net.exe" corpus 22 (elastic 20, splunk 2)
  • "net1.exe" corpus 35 (splunk 19, elastic 16)
  • "netdom.exe"
  • "nltest.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 8, splunk 2)
  • "ntdsutil.exe" corpus 4 (elastic 3, splunk 1)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 104 (elastic 60, splunk 44)
  • "powershell_ise.exe" corpus 50 (splunk 29, elastic 21)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 62 (elastic 33, splunk 29)
  • "qprocess.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "qwinsta.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 7, splunk 1)
  • "reg.exe" corpus 20 (elastic 11, splunk 9)
  • "sc.exe" corpus 29 (splunk 15, elastic 14)
  • "systeminfo.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "wmic.exe" corpus 47 (splunk 27, elastic 20)