Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
QueryName, QueryResults, QueryStatus, answer, answer_count, dvc, process_guid, process_name, query, query_count, reply_code_id, signature, signature_id, src, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies DNS queries to known TOR proxy websites, such as "*.torproject.org" and "www.theonionrouter.com". It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect these queries by monitoring DNS query events from endpoints. This activity is significant because adversaries often use TOR proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic, making it harder to trace their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to obfuscate network traffic, potentially allowing attackers to exfiltrate data or communicate with command and control servers undetected.

Known false positives

  • third party application may use this proxies if allowed in production environment. Filter is needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 22: DNSEvent (DNS query)

Rule body

name: Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query
id: 4c2d198b-da58-48d7-ba27-9368732d0054
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-09-21'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies DNS queries to known TOR proxy websites, such as "*.torproject.org" and "www.theonionrouter.com". It leverages Sysmon EventCode 22 to detect these queries by monitoring DNS query events from endpoints. This activity is significant because adversaries often use TOR proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic, making it harder to trace their actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to obfuscate network traffic, potentially allowing attackers to exfiltrate data or communicate with command and control servers undetected.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 22
search: |-
    `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*.torproject.org", "www.theonionrouter.com")
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY answer answer_count dvc
           process_exec process_guid process_name
           query query_count reply_code_id
           signature signature_id src
           user_id vendor_product QueryName
           QueryResults QueryStatus
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_multi_hop_proxy_tor_website_query_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and sysmon eventcode = 22 dns query events from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: third party application may use this proxies if allowed in production environment. Filter is needed.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.agent_tesla
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dvc
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a process $process_name$ is having a dns query in a tor domain $QueryName$ in $dvc$
analytic_story:
    - AgentTesla
    - Interlock Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1071.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*.torproject.org", "www.theonionrouter.com")

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY answer answer_count dvc
       process_exec process_guid process_name
       query query_count reply_code_id
       signature signature_id src
       user_id vendor_product QueryName
       QueryResults QueryStatus

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_multi_hop_proxy_tor_website_query_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 22 corpus 17 (splunk 17)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"22"
QueryNamein
  • "*.torproject.org"
  • "www.theonionrouter.com"
field:"QueryName" kind:in