Windows Mustang Panda USB Tool Execution

name: Windows Mustang Panda USB Tool Execution
id: e66a167f-6506-4e5b-8e4d-1b04940c70be
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    Detects known executables used for infection or DLL side loading by Mustang Panda being launched from a non-C:\ location.
    This can indicate a compromise via USB, or external storage device.
    You will have to adapt this detection if you do not use C:\ as the root device.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    NOT Processes.process_path="C:\\*"
    Processes.process_path IN (
        "*atkexComSvcRes.exe",
        "*AtlTraceTool8.exe",
        "*browser.ex",
        "*CefSub.exe",
        "*dabs.ex",
        "*FacialFeatureDemo.exe",
        "*GoogleUpdate*.exe",
        "*GUP.exe",
        "*HPCustParticUI.exe",
        "*install_.exe",
        "*mcsync.ex",
        "*melt_64.exe",
        "*mscorsvw.exe",
        "*OleView.exe",
        "*piz.exe",
        "*PlugInInstallerUtility2.exe",
        "*rar330.exe",
        "*Samvd.exe",
        "*scx.exe",
        "*spoololk.exe",
        "*Symantec.exe",
        "*SymantecHp.exe",
        "*Symantecs.exe",
        "*Symantecsy.exe",
        "*upservice.exe",
        "*vivaldi.exe",
        "*wsc_proxy.exe",
        "*ygfdt.exe"
    )
    
    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
       Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_mustang_panda_usb_tool_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Some legitimate tools may be run from external drives or non-C:\ locations for maintenance or portability. Adjust filters accordingly to avoid false alerts for approved usage scenarios.
references:
    - https://decoded.avast.io/threatintel/apt-treasure-trove-avast-suspects-chinese-apt-group-mustang-panda-is-collecting-data-from-burmese-government-agencies-and-opposition-groups/
finding:
    title: Mustang Panda-associated USB tool execution observed on $dest$ via $process$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1574.001
    - T1204.002
    - T1020
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint