Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Network Sniffing Tool Executed

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
CurrentDirectory, IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of common network sniffing tools on Windows systems, including Wireshark, WinPcap, tcpdump, and similar utilities. This activity is significant because attackers use packet capture tools to intercept and analyze network traffic, enabling credential theft, sensitive data harvesting, and reconnaissance of internal network communications. While these tools have legitimate administrative uses, their presence in unexpected environments may indicate an adversary conducting man-in-the-middle attacks or exfiltrating sensitive information traversing the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the exposure of credentials, session tokens, and confidential data, facilitating lateral movement and further compromise of the environment.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate network administrators and security teams may use these tools for authorized network monitoring and troubleshooting. Filter based on approved software inventory and known administrative activity.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access
Discovery

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Network Sniffing Tool Executed
id: 0c594353-e12d-4867-92f6-2a1b8a1faf5f
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-30'
modification_date: '2026-07-30'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of common network sniffing tools on Windows systems, including Wireshark, WinPcap, tcpdump, and similar utilities.
    This activity is significant because attackers use packet capture tools to intercept and analyze network traffic, enabling credential theft, sensitive data harvesting, and reconnaissance of internal network communications.
    While these tools have legitimate administrative uses, their presence in unexpected environments may indicate an adversary conducting man-in-the-middle attacks or exfiltrating sensitive information traversing the network.
    If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the exposure of credentials, session tokens, and confidential data, facilitating lateral movement and further compromise of the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.process_name IN (
        "dumpcap.exe",
        "netcap.exe",
        "netmon.exe",
        "tcpdump.exe",
        "tshark.exe",
        "windump.exe",
        "winpcap.exe",
        "wireshark.exe"
    )
    
    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
       Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
       Processes.user Processes.process_name
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_network_sniffing_tool_executed_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate network administrators and security teams may use these tools for authorized network monitoring and troubleshooting. Filter based on approved software inventory and known administrative activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1040/T1040.md
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Network Sniffing utility execution identified on [$dest$] via [$process_name$] and the Command Line [$process$] executed by [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Credential Dumping
    - Data Exfiltration
    - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
    - Windows Discovery Techniques
    - Network Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1040
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process_name IN (
    "dumpcap.exe",
    "netcap.exe",
    "netmon.exe",
    "tcpdump.exe",
    "tshark.exe",
    "windump.exe",
    "winpcap.exe",
    "wireshark.exe"
)

by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
   Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
   Processes.user Processes.process_name

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_network_sniffing_tool_executed_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.process_namein
  • "dumpcap.exe"
  • "netcap.exe"
  • "netmon.exe"
  • "tcpdump.exe"
  • "tshark.exe"
  • "windump.exe"
  • "winpcap.exe"
  • "wireshark.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:in