Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Office Product Spawned Child Process For Download

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications like Word or Excel initiate network connections, excluding common browsers. This activity is significant as it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.

Known false positives

  • Default browser not in the filter list.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Office Product Spawned Child Process For Download
id: f02b64b8-cbea-4f75-bf77-7a05111566b1
version: 10
creation_date: '2021-04-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies Office applications spawning child processes to download content via HTTP/HTTPS. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications like Word or Excel initiate network connections, excluding common browsers. This activity is significant as it often indicates the use of malicious documents to execute living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for payload delivery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    `process_office_products_parent`
    Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*")
    NOT (
      Processes.original_file_name IN ("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")
      OR
      Processes.process_name IN ("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")
    )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest
    Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
    Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
    Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
    Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
    Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_office_product_spawned_child_process_for_download_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Default browser not in the filter list.
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
finding:
    title: Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Spearphishing Attachments
    - CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability
    - PlugX
    - NjRAT
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1566.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
`process_office_products_parent`
Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*")
NOT (
  Processes.original_file_name IN ("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")
  OR
  Processes.process_name IN ("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe")
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest
Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_office_product_spawned_child_process_for_download_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.original_file_namein"chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "iexplore.exe", "msedge.exe"excludes:Processes.original_file_name
Processes.process_namein"chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "iexplore.exe", "msedge.exe"excludes:Processes.process_name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_process_namein
  • "EQNEDT32.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 9)
  • "Graph.exe"
  • "excel.exe" corpus 28 (elastic 27, splunk 1)
  • "msaccess.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 12)
  • "mspub.exe" corpus 11 (elastic 11)
  • "onenote.exe" corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • "onenoteim.exe"
  • "onenotem.exe"
  • "outlook.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 10)
  • "powerpnt.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 23)
  • "visio.exe"
  • "winproj.exe"
  • "winword.exe" corpus 26 (elastic 26)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:in
Processes.processin
  • "*http:*" corpus 5 (elastic 3, sigma 2)
  • "*https:*" corpus 5 (elastic 3, sigma 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:in