Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning uncommon processes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt of a malicious macro execution or exploitation of an unknown vulnerability in an office product, in order to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.

Known false positives

  • False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process
id: 55d8741c-fa32-4692-8109-410304961eb8
version: 9
creation_date: '2025-01-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a Microsoft Office product spawning uncommon processes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where Office applications are the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt of a malicious macro execution or exploitation of an unknown vulnerability in an office product, in order to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    `process_office_products_parent`
    AND
    (
      Processes.process_name IN (
        bitsadmin.exe,
        certutil.exe,
        cmd.exe,
        cscript.exe,
        mshta.exe,
        powershell.exe,
        pwsh.exe,
        regsvr32.exe,
        rundll32.exe,
        wmic.exe,
        wscript.exe
      )
      OR
      Processes.original_file_name IN (
        bitsadmin.exe,
        CertUtil.exe,
        Cmd.Exe,
        cscript.exe,
        MSHTA.EXE,
        PowerShell.EXE,
        pwsh.dll,
        REGSVR32.EXE,
        RUNDLL32.EXE,
        wmic.exe,
        wscript.exe
      )
    )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_office_product_spawned_uncommon_process_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
references:
    - https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot
    - https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/02cbc1ab80695fc12ff8822b926957c3a600247b9ca412a137f69cb5716c8781/
    - https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2022/09/23/in-the-footsteps-of-the-fancy-bear-powerpoint-graphite/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/latest-remcos-rat-phishing
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
finding:
    title: User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - AgentTesla
    - Azorult
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption
    - CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability
    - DarkCrystal RAT
    - FIN7
    - IcedID
    - NjRAT
    - PlugX
    - Qakbot
    - Remcos
    - Spearphishing Attachments
    - Trickbot
    - Warzone RAT
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - MuddyWater
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1566.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
`process_office_products_parent`
AND
(
  Processes.process_name IN (
    bitsadmin.exe,
    certutil.exe,
    cmd.exe,
    cscript.exe,
    mshta.exe,
    powershell.exe,
    pwsh.exe,
    regsvr32.exe,
    rundll32.exe,
    wmic.exe,
    wscript.exe
  )
  OR
  Processes.original_file_name IN (
    bitsadmin.exe,
    CertUtil.exe,
    Cmd.Exe,
    cscript.exe,
    MSHTA.EXE,
    PowerShell.EXE,
    pwsh.dll,
    REGSVR32.EXE,
    RUNDLL32.EXE,
    wmic.exe,
    wscript.exe
  )
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_office_product_spawned_uncommon_process_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_namein
  • "CertUtil.exe" corpus 30 (sigma 14, elastic 10, splunk 6)
  • "Cmd.Exe" corpus 81 (sigma 43, elastic 21, splunk 17)
  • "MSHTA.EXE" corpus 40 (elastic 21, sigma 13, splunk 6)
  • "PowerShell.EXE" corpus 138 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 24)
  • "REGSVR32.EXE" corpus 37 (sigma 17, elastic 15, splunk 5)
  • "RUNDLL32.EXE" corpus 78 (sigma 35, elastic 22, splunk 21)
  • "bitsadmin.exe" corpus 20 (sigma 9, elastic 8, splunk 2, kusto 1)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 32 (sigma 17, elastic 15)
  • "pwsh.dll" corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)
  • "wmic.exe" corpus 80 (sigma 38, elastic 24, splunk 18)
  • "wscript.exe" corpus 38 (elastic 21, sigma 17)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:in
Processes.parent_process_namein
  • "EQNEDT32.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 9)
  • "Graph.exe"
  • "excel.exe" corpus 28 (elastic 27, splunk 1)
  • "msaccess.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 12)
  • "mspub.exe" corpus 11 (elastic 11)
  • "onenote.exe" corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • "onenoteim.exe"
  • "onenotem.exe"
  • "outlook.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 10)
  • "powerpnt.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 23)
  • "visio.exe"
  • "winproj.exe"
  • "winword.exe" corpus 26 (elastic 26)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:in
Processes.process_namein
  • "bitsadmin.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 21, splunk 2)
  • "certutil.exe" corpus 44 (elastic 38, splunk 6)
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 67 (elastic 65, splunk 2)
  • "mshta.exe" corpus 84 (elastic 79, splunk 5)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "regsvr32.exe" corpus 73 (elastic 68, splunk 5)
  • "rundll32.exe" corpus 126 (elastic 100, splunk 26)
  • "wmic.exe" corpus 66 (elastic 39, splunk 27)
  • "wscript.exe" corpus 83 (elastic 82, splunk 1)
field:"process_name" kind:in