Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Possible Credential Dumping
The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10 | ProcessAccess |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Possible Credential Dumping
id: e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-01-11'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 10
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\lsass.exe granted_access IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*", "*kernelbase.dll*", "*kernel32.dll*") NOT SourceUser IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId UserID dest granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.
known_false_positives: False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.
references:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/Windows/TestHarnesses/T1003.001_DumpLSASS/DumpLSASS.ps1
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user_id$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user_id = "$user_id$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user_id$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user_id$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.
entity:
field: user_id
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.
threat_objects:
- field: SourceImage
type: process
analytic_story:
- Detect Zerologon Attack
- CISA AA22-264A
- Credential Dumping
- CISA AA23-347A
- DarkSide Ransomware
- CISA AA22-257A
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\lsass.exe granted_access IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*", "*kernelbase.dll*", "*kernel32.dll*") NOT SourceUser IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE")
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId UserID dest granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
SourceUser | in | "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE", "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
CallTrace | in |
|
EventCode | eq |
|
TargetImage | eq |
|
granted_access | in |
|