Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace
The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace
id: f8b482f4-6d62-49fa-a905-dfa15698317b
version: 15
creation_date: '2023-01-26'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*System.Security.Cryptography*" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN ("*SHA*", "*MD5*", "*DeriveBytes*"))
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user_id = "$user_id$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user_id$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$
- field: user_id
type: user
score: 20
message: A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$
analytic_story:
- AsyncRAT
- XWorm
- VIP Keylogger
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/asyncrat_crypto_pwh_namespace/windows-powershell-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*System.Security.Cryptography*" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN ("*SHA*", "*MD5*", "*DeriveBytes*"))
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
ScriptBlockText | in | "*DeriveBytes*", "*MD5*", "*SHA*" |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | eq |
|