Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.

Known false positives

  • False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace
id: f8b482f4-6d62-49fa-a905-dfa15698317b
version: 16
creation_date: '2023-01-26'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving the cryptography namespace via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts using cryptographic functions, excluding common hashes like SHA and MD5. This activity is significant as it is often associated with malware that decrypts or decodes additional malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute further code, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the environment. Analysts should investigate the parent process, decrypted data, network connections, and the user executing the script.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*System.Security.Cryptography*" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN ("*SHA*", "*MD5*", "*DeriveBytes*"))
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$
        - field: user_id
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script contains cryptography command detected on host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - AsyncRAT
    - XWorm
    - VIP Keylogger
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*System.Security.Cryptography*" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN ("*SHA*", "*MD5*", "*DeriveBytes*"))

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ScriptBlockTextin"*DeriveBytes*", "*MD5*", "*SHA*"excludes:ScriptBlockText

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTexteq
  • "*System.Security.Cryptography*"
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq