Detection rules › Splunk
Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text associated with this cmdlet. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to retrieve and decrypt stored credentials from SYSVOL, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network by exploiting exposed credentials.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1552.006 Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery
id: 0130a0df-83a1-4647-9011-841e950ff302
version: 15
creation_date: '2023-03-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell cmdlet, which is used to search for unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify specific script block text associated with this cmdlet. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to retrieve and decrypt stored credentials from SYSVOL, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network by exploiting exposed credentials.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Get-GPPPassword OR ScriptBlockText=Get-CachedGPPPassword)
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/20/group-policy-preferences/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/credential-dumping-group-policy-preferences-gpp/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevation-of-privilege-may-13-2014-60734e15-af79-26ca-ea53-8cd617073c30
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search Computer = "$Computer$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$Computer$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $dest$
entity:
field: user_id
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Commandlets leveraged to discover GPP credentials were executed on $dest$
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1552.006
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.006/powershell_gpp_discovery/win-powershell.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=Get-GPPPassword OR ScriptBlockText=Get-CachedGPPPassword)
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | eq |
|