Detection rules › Splunk

Windows PowerView SPN Discovery

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-DomainUser or Get-NetUser PowerShell cmdlets with the -SPN parameter, indicating the use of PowerView for SPN discovery. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify these specific commands. This activity is significant as it suggests an attempt to enumerate domain accounts associated with Service Principal Names (SPNs), a common precursor to Kerberoasting attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to identify and target accounts for credential theft, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows PowerView SPN Discovery
id: a7093c28-796c-4ebb-9997-e2c18b870837
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-06-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUser` PowerShell cmdlets with the `-SPN` parameter, indicating the use of PowerView for SPN discovery. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify these specific commands. This activity is significant as it suggests an attempt to enumerate domain accounts associated with Service Principal Names (SPNs), a common precursor to Kerberoasting attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to identify and target accounts for credential theft, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN*
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
known_false_positives: False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
references:
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: PowerView commandlets used for SPN discovery executed on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Interlock Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1558.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/powerview-2/windows-powershell.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN*

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 268 (splunk 268)
ScriptBlockTexteq
  • *-SPN*
  • *Get-DomainUser* corpus 3 (splunk 3)
  • *Get-NetUser* corpus 4 (splunk 4)