Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Process Injection into Commonly Abused Processes
The following analytic detects process injection into executables that are commonly abused using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.
Known false positives
- False positives may be present based on SourceImage paths, particularly those with a legitimate reason for accessing lsass.exe or regsvr32.exe. If removing the paths is important, realize svchost and many native binaries inject into processes consistently. Restrict or tune as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10: ProcessAccess |
Rule body
name: Windows Process Injection into Commonly Abused Processes
id: 1e1dedc6-f6f3-41a0-9dd7-a1245904fe75
version: 8
creation_date: '2023-02-24'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: 0xC0FFEEEE, Github Community
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects process injection into executables that are commonly abused using Sysmon EventCode 10. It identifies suspicious GrantedAccess requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files. This behavior is often associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 10
search: |-
`sysmon`
EventCode=10
TargetImage IN (
"*\\backgroundtaskhost.exe",
"*\\calc.exe",
"*\\CalculatorApp.exe",
"*\\chrome.exe",
"*\\dllhost.exe",
"*\\edge.exe",
"*\\firefox.exe",
"*\\lsass.exe",
"*\\mspaint.exe",
"*\\notepad.exe",
"*\\regsvr32.exe",
"*\\searchprotocolhost.exe",
"*\\spoolsv.exe",
"*\\svchost.exe",
"*\\werfault.exe",
"*\\win32calc.exe",
"*\\wordpad.exe",
"*\\wuauclt.exe"
)
NOT SourceImage IN (
"*:\\Windows\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\Program Files\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"
)
GrantedAccess IN (
"0x1f3fff",
"0x1fffff",
"0x40"
)
| stats values(user) as user
min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime count
by dest user_id parent_process_name parent_process_guid
process_name process_guid process_id signature SourceImage
TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace
| eval CallTrace=split(CallTrace, "|")
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| table firstTime lastTime dest user_id parent_process_name parent_process_guid process_name process_guid process_id signature SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace
| `windows_process_injection_into_commonly_abused_processes_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present based on SourceImage paths, particularly those with a legitimate reason for accessing lsass.exe or regsvr32.exe. If removing the paths is important, realize svchost and many native binaries inject into processes consistently. Restrict or tune as needed.
references:
- https://dominicbreuker.com/post/learning_sliver_c2_08_implant_basics/
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/process-injection/
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: An instance of $SourceImage$ injecting into $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $dest$.
threat_objects:
- field: SourceImage
type: process
- field: TargetImage
type: process
analytic_story:
- BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework
- Earth Alux
- SAP NetWeaver Exploitation
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1055.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
EventCode=10
TargetImage IN (
"*\\backgroundtaskhost.exe",
"*\\calc.exe",
"*\\CalculatorApp.exe",
"*\\chrome.exe",
"*\\dllhost.exe",
"*\\edge.exe",
"*\\firefox.exe",
"*\\lsass.exe",
"*\\mspaint.exe",
"*\\notepad.exe",
"*\\regsvr32.exe",
"*\\searchprotocolhost.exe",
"*\\spoolsv.exe",
"*\\svchost.exe",
"*\\werfault.exe",
"*\\win32calc.exe",
"*\\wordpad.exe",
"*\\wuauclt.exe"
)
NOT SourceImage IN (
"*:\\Windows\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\Program Files\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"
)
GrantedAccess IN (
"0x1f3fff",
"0x1fffff",
"0x40"
)
Stage 2: stats
| stats values(user) as user
min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime count
by dest user_id parent_process_name parent_process_guid
process_name process_guid process_id signature SourceImage
TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace
Stage 3: eval
| eval CallTrace=split(CallTrace, "|")
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: table
| table firstTime lastTime dest user_id parent_process_name parent_process_guid process_name process_guid process_id signature SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace
Stage 7: search
| `windows_process_injection_into_commonly_abused_processes_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
SourceImage | in | "*:\\Windows\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Program Files\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*" | excludes:SourceImage |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"10" |
GrantedAccess | in |
| field:"GrantedAccess" kind:in |
TargetImage | in |
| field:"TargetImage" kind:in |