Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Rdp AutomaticDestinations Deletion
This detection identifies the deletion of files within the AutomaticDestinations folder, located under a user’s AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent directory. These files are part of the Windows Jump List feature, which records recently accessed files and folders tied to specific applications. Each .automaticDestinations-ms file corresponds to a program (e.g., Explorer, Word, Notepad) and can be valuable for forensic analysis of user activity. Adversaries may target this folder to erase evidence of their actions, such as which documents or directories were accessed during a session. This type of deletion is rarely seen during normal user activity and may indicate deliberate anti-forensic behavior. When correlated with suspicious logon events, RDP usage, or script execution, this activity may represent an attempt to cover tracks after data access, lateral movement, or staging for exfiltration. Detecting removal of these artifacts can highlight post-compromise cleanup efforts and help analysts reconstruct attacker behavior.
Known false positives
- False positives will be present, filter as needed or restrict to critical assets on the perimeter.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Windows Rdp AutomaticDestinations Deletion
id: e40a40a1-9fea-4554-abdf-b164422f0627
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-08-06'
modification_date: '2026-07-20'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This detection identifies the deletion of files within the AutomaticDestinations folder, located under a user’s AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent directory. These files are part of the Windows Jump List feature, which records recently accessed files and folders tied to specific applications. Each .automaticDestinations-ms file corresponds to a program (e.g., Explorer, Word, Notepad) and can be valuable for forensic analysis of user activity. Adversaries may target this folder to erase evidence of their actions, such as which documents or directories were accessed during a session. This type of deletion is rarely seen during normal user activity and may indicate deliberate anti-forensic behavior. When correlated with suspicious logon events, RDP usage, or script execution, this activity may represent an attempt to cover tracks after data access, lateral movement, or staging for exfiltration. Detecting removal of these artifacts can highlight post-compromise cleanup efforts and help analysts reconstruct attacker behavior.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 23
- Sysmon EventID 26
search: |-
`sysmon`
EventCode IN (23, 26)
TargetFilename IN ("*\\Recent\\AutomaticDestinations*")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by action dest dvc file_path file_hash file_name
file_modify_time process_exec process_guid process_id
process_name process_path signature
signature_id user user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_rdp_automaticdestinations_deletion_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest logs that include the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are utilizing Sysmon, ensure you have at least version 2.0 of the Sysmon TA installed.
known_false_positives: False positives will be present, filter as needed or restrict to critical assets on the perimeter.
references:
- https://medium.com/@bonguides25/how-to-clear-rdp-connections-history-in-windows-cf0ffb67f344
- https://thelocalh0st.github.io/posts/rdp/
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A file related to rdp automatic destination folder has been deleted on $dest$.
analytic_story:
- Windows RDP Artifacts and Defense Evasion
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1070.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
EventCode IN (23, 26)
TargetFilename IN ("*\\Recent\\AutomaticDestinations*")
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by action dest dvc file_path file_hash file_name
file_modify_time process_exec process_guid process_id
process_name process_path signature
signature_id user user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_rdp_automaticdestinations_deletion_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | in |
| field:"EventID" kind:in |
TargetFilename | in |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:in |