Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Registry Dotnet ETW Disabled Via ENV Variable

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the COMPlus_ETWEnabled registry value under the "Environment" registry key path for both user (HKCU\Environment) and machine (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment) scopes. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.

Known false positives

  • Setting the "COMPlus_ETWEnabled" value as a global environment variable either in user or machine scope should only happen during debugging use cases, hence the false positives rate should be very minimal.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Registry Dotnet ETW Disabled Via ENV Variable
id: 55502381-5cce-491b-9277-7cb1d10bc0df
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-10-07'
modification_date: '2026-08-05'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework.
    It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the COMPlus_ETWEnabled registry value under the "Environment" registry key path for both user (HKCU\Environment) and machine (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment) scopes.
    This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs.
    If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
    
    Registry.registry_path="*\\Environment*"
    Registry.registry_value_name="COMPlus_ETWEnabled"
    Registry.registry_value_data IN ("0x00000000", "0")
    
    by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
       Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
       Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
       Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
       Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
    | where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_registry_dotnet_etw_disabled_via_env_variable_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: |-
    Setting the "COMPlus_ETWEnabled" value as a global environment variable either in user or machine scope should only happen during debugging use cases, hence the false positives rate should be very minimal.
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3
    - https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006/
finding:
    title: The registry key [$registry_path$] with the value name [$registry_value_name$] was modified to the value [$registry_value_data$] to disable the ETW for the .NET Framework in [$dest$]
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: The registry key [$registry_path$] with the value name [$registry_value_name$] was modified to the value [$registry_value_data$] to disable the ETW for the .NET Framework in [$dest$]
analytic_story:
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

Registry.registry_path="*\\Environment*"
Registry.registry_value_name="COMPlus_ETWEnabled"
Registry.registry_value_data IN ("0x00000000", "0")

by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
   Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
   Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
   Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: where

| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_registry_dotnet_etw_disabled_via_env_variable_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Registry.registry_patheq
  • "*\\Environment*"
field:"registry_path" kind:eq
Registry.registry_value_datain
  • "0" corpus 18 (elastic 15, sigma 3)
  • "0x00000000" corpus 41 (splunk 33, elastic 8)
field:"Details" kind:in
Registry.registry_value_nameeq
  • "COMPlus_ETWEnabled"
field:"registry_value_name" kind:eq
registry_value_datais_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"Details" kind:is_not_null