Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It leverages Sysmon EventID 7 to monitor registry changes in paths and values related to Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a common tactic for bypassing security measures and maintaining persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Review the modified registry paths and concurrent processes to identify the attack source.
Known false positives
- Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body
name: Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification
id: 3b4e18cb-497f-4073-85ad-1ada7c2107ab
version: 10
creation_date: '2023-10-10'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It leverages Sysmon EventID 7 to monitor registry changes in paths and values related to Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a common tactic for bypassing security measures and maintaining persistence. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Review the modified registry paths and concurrent processes to identify the attack source.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml
- https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
- https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP
- https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/11/06/hijacking-digital-signatures/
finding:
title: Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification detected on $dest$.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1553.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Registry.registry_path | in |
| field:"registry_path" kind:in |
Registry.registry_value_name | in |
| field:"registry_value_name" kind:in |