Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Remote Host Computer Management Access

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of mmc.exe to launch Computer Management (compmgmt.msc) and connect to a remote machine. This technique allows administrators to access system management tools, including Event Viewer, Services, Shared Folders, and Local Users & Groups, without initiating a full remote desktop session. While commonly used for legitimate administrative purposes, adversaries may leverage this method for remote reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence. Monitoring the execution of mmc.exe with the /computer:{hostname/ip} argument can help detect unauthorized system administration attempts or lateral movement within a network.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Remote Host Computer Management Access
id: 455da527-0047-4610-a3ca-b4a005c2d346
version: 6
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the use of mmc.exe to launch Computer Management (compmgmt.msc) and connect to a remote machine. This technique allows administrators to access system management tools, including Event Viewer, Services, Shared Folders, and Local Users & Groups, without initiating a full remote desktop session. While commonly used for legitimate administrative purposes, adversaries may leverage this method for remote reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence. Monitoring the execution of mmc.exe with the /computer:{hostname/ip} argument can help detect unauthorized system administration attempts or lateral movement within a network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name="mmc.exe"
        AND
        Processes.process = "*compmgmt.msc *"
        AND
        Processes.process = "*/computer:*"
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_remote_host_computer_management_access_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: administrator or power user can execute command shell or script to access Windows Remote Management.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-071a
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a computer management process command $process$ executed on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Medusa Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1021.006
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/compmgtm_access/compmgmt_load.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.process_name="mmc.exe"
    AND
    Processes.process = "*compmgmt.msc *"
    AND
    Processes.process = "*/computer:*"
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_remote_host_computer_management_access_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.processeq
  • "*/computer:*" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • "*compmgmt.msc *"
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "mmc.exe" corpus 7 (splunk 5, elastic 2)