Detection rules › Splunk
Windows RMM Named Pipe
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes, which is a technique often used by offensive tools. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
Known false positives
- Some false positives may occur from RMM software used in your environment. Apply filters based on known legitimate RMM software in your environment to reduce false positives.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth | |
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 17: PipeEvent (Pipe Created) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 18: PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) |
Rule body
name: Windows RMM Named Pipe
id: c07c7138-edf5-4a16-8b24-3842599235bf
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-12-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes, which is a technique often used by offensive tools.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 17
- Sysmon EventID 18
search: |
`sysmon`
(EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
"*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
"System"
)
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path signature signature_id
vendor_product pipe_name user_id Image process_name
| lookup suspicious_rmm_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, description
| where isnotnull(tool)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_rmm_named_pipe_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon,
you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: |
Some false positives may occur from RMM software used in your environment. Apply filters
based on known legitimate RMM software in your environment to reduce false positives.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: An instance of $process_name$ located in $process_path$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known RMM named pipe $pipe_name$.
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Cactus Ransomware
- CISA AA24-241A
- Command And Control
- GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
- Gozi Malware
- Insider Threat
- Interlock Ransomware
- Ransomware
- Remote Monitoring and Management Software
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
- Scattered Spider
- Seashell Blizzard
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1559
- T1021.002
- T1055
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
(EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
"*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
"System"
)
Stage 2: stats
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path signature signature_id
vendor_product pipe_name user_id Image process_name
Stage 3: lookup
| lookup suspicious_rmm_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, description
Stage 4: where
| where isnotnull(tool)
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_rmm_named_pipe_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process_path | in | "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*", "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*", "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*", "*:\\Program Files\\Google*", "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe", "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*", "System" | excludes:process_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
tool | is_not_null | field:"tool" kind:is_not_null |