Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery
The following analytic detects the use of the [Adsisearcher] type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out domain policies, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
Known false positives
- Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body
name: Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery
id: 80ffaede-1f12-49d5-a86e-b4b599b68b3c
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-08-25'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out domain policies, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*.SearchRooT*" ScriptBlockText = "*.gplink*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
references:
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
- https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Windows PowerShell [Adsisearcher] was used user enumeration on endpoint $dest$
analytic_story:
- Data Destruction
- Active Directory Discovery
- Industroyer2
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1087.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*.SearchRooT*" ScriptBlockText = "*.gplink*"
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104" |
ScriptBlockText | eq |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq |