Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change
This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry. This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded. This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware. Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1112 Modify Registry |
| Defense Impairment | T1112 Modify Registry |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13 | RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change
id: a93df51e-e612-40b7-a105-33e288160575
version: 3
creation_date: '2022-04-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry.
This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded.
This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware.
Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
Registry.action=modified
by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: |
There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value.
Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.
references:
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ghost_rat
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrasm/22ad9f0e-4349-43e0-92b3-37f7a9c7ca41
- https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/the-curious-case-of-gh0st-malware/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Routing and Remote Access Service registry key [$registry_path$] was modified with the value [$registry_value_data$] by [$user$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
- field: registry_path
type: registry_path
analytic_story:
- Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1112
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/remote_access_reg/remote_access_reg.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
Registry.action=modified
by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Registry.action | eq |
|
Registry.registry_path | eq |
|