Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry. This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded. This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware. Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.

Known false positives

  • There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value. Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence
Defense Impairment

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change
id: a93df51e-e612-40b7-a105-33e288160575
version: 3
creation_date: '2022-04-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry.
    This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded.
    This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware.
    Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
    
    Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
    Registry.action=modified
    
    by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
       Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
       Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
       Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
       Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
       Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: |
    There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value.
    Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ghost_rat
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrasm/22ad9f0e-4349-43e0-92b3-37f7a9c7ca41
    - https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/the-curious-case-of-gh0st-malware/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Routing and Remote Access Service registry key [$registry_path$] was modified with the value [$registry_value_data$] by [$user$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: registry_path
      type: registry_path
analytic_story:
    - Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1112
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
Registry.action=modified

by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
   Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
   Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
   Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
   Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Registry.actioneq
  • modified corpus 7 (splunk 7)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"modified"
Registry.registry_patheq
  • "*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
field:"registry_path" kind:eq