Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Rundll32 Execution With Log.DLL
Identifies the execution of rundll32 with a command line argument of "log.dll", as used in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis backdoor campaign. Attackers placed a malicious "log.dll" in "%AppData%\Bluetooth" and invoked it via rundll32.exe "log.dll,LogInit" to decrypt and execute ShellCode. The legitimate Bitdefender Submission Wizard (BDSubmit.exe, bdsw.exe) also uses log.dll and is vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1574 Hijack Execution Flow |
| Stealth | T1574 Hijack Execution Flow |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Rundll32 Execution With Log.DLL
id: f9593331-804c-4268-8b4c-2693c5ae786c
version: 3
creation_date: '2026-03-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
Identifies the execution of rundll32 with a command line argument of "log.dll", as used in the Lotus Blossom Chrysalis backdoor campaign.
Attackers placed a malicious "log.dll" in "%AppData%\Bluetooth" and invoked it via rundll32.exe "log.dll,LogInit" to decrypt and execute ShellCode.
The legitimate Bitdefender Submission Wizard (BDSubmit.exe, bdsw.exe) also uses log.dll and is vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
`process_rundll32`
Processes.process="* log.dll*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_rundll32_execution_with_log_dll_filter`
how_to_implement: |
Ingest process creation logs (Sysmon EventID 1 or equivalent) and map them to the Endpoint.Processes data model. Ensure command-line arguments are captured so that "log.dll" appears in the process field. The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Sysmon and CIM are required.
known_false_positives: |
Legitimate use of rundll32 to load log.dll from trusted locations may trigger this.
Allowlist known paths or parent processes as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Rundll32 loaded log.dll on $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential Lotus Blossom-style DLL side loading abuse.
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: Rundll32 loaded log.dll on $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential Lotus Blossom-style DLL side loading abuse.
threat_objects:
- field: process
type: process
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Lotus Blossom Chrysalis Backdoor
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1574
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.002/lotus_blossom_chrysalis/windows-sysmon.log
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
`process_rundll32`
Processes.process="* log.dll*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_rundll32_execution_with_log_dll_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.original_file_name | eq |
|
Processes.process | eq |
|
Processes.process_name | eq |
|