Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Scheduled Task Created in a Group Policy Object
When a scheduled task is created within a Group Policy, a characteristic file ScheduledTasks.xml with its definition is created in the respective subfolder of the SYSVOL share. This rule can hit on legitimate GPO scheduled task creation, but this does not happen often and is therefore an effective way to monitor for malicious scheduled tasks.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
| Persistence | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
| Privilege Escalation | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
| Defense Impairment | T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Scheduled Task Created in a Group Policy Object
id: 350032cd-3d3f-4278-afc8-e01cf5c33524
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
When a scheduled task is created within a Group Policy, a characteristic file ScheduledTasks.xml with its definition is created in the respective subfolder of the SYSVOL share.
This rule can hit on legitimate GPO scheduled task creation, but this does not happen often and is therefore an effective way to monitor for malicious scheduled tasks.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5145
search: |-
`wineventlog_security`
EventID=5145
ShareName="\\*\\SYSVOL"
RelativeTargetName="*\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml"
RelativeTargetName="*\\Policies\\*"
AccessList IN (
"*%%4417*",
"*%%4418*"
)
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer ShareName RelativeTargetName AccessList
| rename Computer as dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_created_in_a_group_policy_object_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Some legitimate scheduled tasks are occasionally created via Group Policy Objects in managed environments. Filter alerts for approved GPO deployments to reduce false positives.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145
drilldown_searches:
- earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Potential Scheduled task created in a Group Policy Object activity observed on $dest$.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Scheduled Tasks
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1484.001
- T1053.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/snapattack/snapattack.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security`
EventID=5145
ShareName="\\*\\SYSVOL"
RelativeTargetName="*\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml"
RelativeTargetName="*\\Policies\\*"
AccessList IN (
"*%%4417*",
"*%%4418*"
)
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer ShareName RelativeTargetName AccessList
Stage 4: rename
| rename Computer as dest
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_scheduled_task_created_in_a_group_policy_object_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AccessList | in |
|
EventID | eq |
|
RelativeTargetName | eq |
|
ShareName | eq |
|