Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Scheduled Task DLL Module Loaded

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
dest, image_loaded, original_file_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects instances where the taskschd.dll is loaded by processes running in suspicious or writable directories. This activity is unusual, as legitimate processes that load taskschd.dll typically reside in protected system locations. Malware or threat actors may attempt to load this DLL from writable or non-standard directories to manipulate the Task Scheduler and execute malicious tasks. By identifying processes that load taskschd.dll in these unsafe locations, this detection helps security analysts flag potentially malicious activity and investigate further to prevent unauthorized system modifications.

Known false positives

  • Third party Legitimate application may load this task schedule dll module.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule body

name: Windows Scheduled Task DLL Module Loaded
id: bc5b2304-f241-419b-874a-e927f667b7b6
version: 9
creation_date: '2024-09-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects instances where the taskschd.dll is loaded by processes running in suspicious or writable directories. This activity is unusual, as legitimate processes that load taskschd.dll typically reside in protected system locations. Malware or threat actors may attempt to load this DLL from writable or non-standard directories to manipulate the Task Scheduler and execute malicious tasks. By identifying processes that load taskschd.dll in these unsafe locations, this detection helps security analysts flag potentially malicious activity and investigate further to prevent unauthorized system modifications.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image IN ("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*", "\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*") ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_dll_module_loaded_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Third party Legitimate application may load this task schedule dll module.
references:
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/chinese-malware-appears-earnest-across-cybercrime-threat-landscape
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/valleyrat-campaign-targeting-chinese-speakers
finding:
    title: A taskschd.dll was loaded by a process - [$Image$] on [$dest$]
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - ValleyRAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image IN ("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*", "\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*") ImageLoaded = "*\\taskschd.dll"

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_scheduled_task_dll_module_loaded_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 7 corpus 41 (splunk 39, elastic 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7"
Imagein
  • "*Recycle.bin*"
  • "*\\PerfLogs\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Default\\*"
  • "*\\Windows\\Media\\*"
  • "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*"
  • "*\\temp\\*" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
  • "*\\users\\public\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\debug\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\fonts\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\temp\\*"
  • "\\Windows\\repair\\*"
field:"Image" kind:in
ImageLoadedeq
  • "*\\taskschd.dll" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:eq