Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects when the Task Scheduler service ("svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule") spawns common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries such as "powershell.exe" or "cmd.exe". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell
id: d8120352-3b62-4e3c-8cb6-7b47584dd5e8
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-07-11'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects when the Task Scheduler service ("svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule") spawns common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries such as "powershell.exe" or "cmd.exe".
    This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships.
    This activity is significant as attackers often abuse the Task Scheduler for execution and persistence, blending in with legitimate Windows operations.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
    count min(_time) as firstTime
          max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.parent_process_name="svchost.exe"
    Processes.parent_process="*-k*"
    Processes.parent_process= "*netsvcs*"
    Processes.parent_process="*-p*"
    Processes.parent_process="*-s*"
    Processes.parent_process="*Schedule*"
    Processes.process_name IN(
        "bash.exe",
        "cmd.exe",
        "cscript.exe",
        "ksh.exe",
        "powershell.exe",
        "pwsh.exe",
        "scrcons.exe",
        "sh.exe",
        "wscript.exe",
        "zsh.exe"
    )
    
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_scheduled_task_service_spawned_shell_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Certain scheduled tasks will intentionally call a script via PowerShell or Cmd for example.
    These will trigger this detection. Evaluate if they are legitimate and apply filters as needed.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-evolution-gootloader-operations
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-windows-scheduled-tasks-and-the-processes-running-them-218d1eed4cce
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A windows scheduled task spawned the shell application $process_name$ on $dest$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A windows scheduled task spawned the shell application $process_name$ on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
    - T1059
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/gootloader/partial_ttps/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
      max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.parent_process_name="svchost.exe"
Processes.parent_process="*-k*"
Processes.parent_process= "*netsvcs*"
Processes.parent_process="*-p*"
Processes.parent_process="*-s*"
Processes.parent_process="*Schedule*"
Processes.process_name IN(
    "bash.exe",
    "cmd.exe",
    "cscript.exe",
    "ksh.exe",
    "powershell.exe",
    "pwsh.exe",
    "scrcons.exe",
    "sh.exe",
    "wscript.exe",
    "zsh.exe"
)

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_scheduled_task_service_spawned_shell_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.parent_processeq
  • "*-k*"
  • "*-p*"
  • "*-s*"
  • "*Schedule*" corpus 2 (splunk 1, kusto 1)
  • "*netsvcs*"
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "svchost.exe" corpus 13 (elastic 6, splunk 5, kusto 2)
Processes.process_namein
  • "bash.exe"
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 25 (elastic 23, splunk 2)
  • "ksh.exe"
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 104 (elastic 60, splunk 44)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 62 (elastic 33, splunk 29)
  • "scrcons.exe"
  • "sh.exe"
  • "wscript.exe" corpus 29 (elastic 28, splunk 1)
  • "zsh.exe"