Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.

Known false positives

  • False positives may arise from legitimate applications that create tasks to run as SYSTEM. Therefore, it's recommended to adjust filters based on parent process or modify the query to include world writable paths for restriction.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges
id: 2f15e1a4-0fc2-49dd-919e-cbbe60699218
version: 16
creation_date: '2023-01-26'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/rl *" Processes.process = "* highest *" by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_with_highest_privileges_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may arise from legitimate applications that create tasks to run as SYSTEM. Therefore, it's recommended to adjust filters based on parent process or modify the query to include world writable paths for restriction.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat
finding:
    title: A $process_name$ process created a scheduled task $process$ with highest run level privilege on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - SolarWinds WHD RCE Post Exploitation
    - XWorm
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Scheduled Tasks
    - Quasar RAT
    - AsyncRAT
    - RedLine Stealer
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Castle RAT
    - NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/rl *" Processes.process = "* highest *" by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_scheduled_task_with_highest_privileges_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.processeq
  • "* highest *"
  • "*/rl *"
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "schtasks.exe" corpus 30 (elastic 19, splunk 11)
field:"process_name" kind:eq