Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
| Persistence | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
| Privilege Escalation | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4698 | A scheduled task was created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4700 | A scheduled task was enabled. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4702 | A scheduled task was updated. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
id: 9e9ab4e3-c9d0-4967-a197-6d755e8a7e6e
version: 9
creation_date: '2025-02-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4698
- Windows Event Log Security 4700
- Windows Event Log Security 4702
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
| xmlkv TaskContent
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
| where isnotnull(tool_type)
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231213.pdf
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/11/06/bengal-cat-lovers-in-australia-get-psspsspssd-in-google-driven-gootloader-campaign/
- https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/blob/main/Lists/suspicious_windows_tasks_list.csv
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$","$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
- name: Investigate schedule tasks on $dest$
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702) | xmlkv TaskContent | search dest="$dest$" AND TaskName = "$TaskName$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
finding:
title: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
threat_objects:
- field: Command
type: signature
analytic_story:
- Scheduled Tasks
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Ransomware
- Ryuk Ransomware
- 0bj3ctivity Stealer
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
- Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1053.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/winevent_scheduled_task_with_suspect_name/windows-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
Stage 2: eval
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
TaskContent =isnotnull(TaskContentNew)TaskContentNewTaskContentStage 3: xmlkv
| xmlkv TaskContent
Stage 4: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
Stage 5: lookup
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
Stage 6: where
| where isnotnull(tool_type)
Stage 7: eval
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 10: search
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.