Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Command, Enabled, Hidden, computer_name, signature_id, task_name, user
Author
Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.

Known false positives

  • False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
id: 9e9ab4e3-c9d0-4967-a197-6d755e8a7e6e
version: 9
creation_date: '2025-02-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4698
    - Windows Event Log Security 4700
    - Windows Event Log Security 4702
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
    | eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
    | xmlkv TaskContent
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
    | lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
    | where isnotnull(tool_type)
    | eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
    - https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231213.pdf
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/11/06/bengal-cat-lovers-in-australia-get-psspsspssd-in-google-driven-gootloader-campaign/
    - https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/blob/main/Lists/suspicious_windows_tasks_list.csv
finding:
    title: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
threat_objects:
    - field: Command
      type: signature
analytic_story:
    - Scheduled Tasks
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Ransomware
    - Ryuk Ransomware
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)

Stage 2: eval

| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
TaskContent =
ifisnotnull(TaskContentNew)TaskContentNew
elseTaskContent

Stage 3: xmlkv

| xmlkv TaskContent

Stage 4: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode

Stage 5: lookup

| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
Lookup table
windows_suspicious_tasks
Key field
task_name as TaskName

Stage 6: where

| where isnotnull(tool_type)

Stage 7: eval

| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer

Stage 8: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 9: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 10: search

| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodein
  • 4698 corpus 13 (splunk 13)
  • 4700
  • 4702
field:"EventID" kind:in
tool_typeis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"tool_type" kind:is_not_null