Windows Sensitive Registry Hive Dump Via CommandLine

name: Windows Sensitive Registry Hive Dump Via CommandLine
id: 5aaff29d-0cce-405b-9ee8-5d06b49d045e
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-05-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    (
      (
        (Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)
        Processes.process IN ("*save*", "*export*")
      )
      OR
      (
        (Processes.process_name=regedit.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGEDIT.exe)
        Processes.process IN ("*/E *", "*-E *")
      )
    )
    Processes.process IN (
      "*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM*",
      "*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security*",
      "*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System*",
      "*HKLM\\SAM*",
      "*HKLM\\Security*",
      "*HKLM\\System*",
    )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
    Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
    Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
    Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
    Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
    Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Credential Dumping
    - DarkSide Ransomware
    - Data Destruction
    - Industroyer2
    - Volt Typhoon
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Seashell Blizzard
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1003.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test - Sysmon
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit