Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC
The following analytic detects the use of GACUtil.exe to add a DLL into the Global Assembly Cache (GAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be called by any application, potentially enabling widespread code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code across the operating system, leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.
Known false positives
- False positives may be present if gacutil.exe is utilized day to day by developers. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC
id: 7c025ef0-9e65-4c57-be39-1c13dbb1613e
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-01-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of GACUtil.exe to add a DLL into the Global Assembly Cache (GAC). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because adding a DLL to the GAC allows it to be called by any application, potentially enabling widespread code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code across the operating system, leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=gacutil.exe Processes.process IN ("*-i *","*/i *")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_server_software_component_gacutil_install_to_gac_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present if gacutil.exe is utilized day to day by developers. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/gacutil.exe-F2FE4DF74BD214EDDC1A658043828089.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/app-domains/gac
finding:
title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a module to the global assembly cache.
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a module to the global assembly cache.
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- IIS Components
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1505.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=gacutil.exe Processes.process IN ("*-i *","*/i *")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_server_software_component_gacutil_install_to_gac_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.process | in |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:in |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |