Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Service Create RemComSvc
The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the "RemCom Service" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
| Privilege Escalation | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event |
|---|---|
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045 |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Service Create RemComSvc
id: 0be4b5d6-c449-4084-b945-2392b519c33b
version: 10
creation_date: '2023-03-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the "RemCom Service" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log System 7045
search: |-
`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName="RemCom Service"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest ImagePath ServiceName
ServiceType
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this analytic, the Windows EventCode 7045 will need to be logged. The Windows TA for Splunk is also recommended.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter as needed based on administrative activity.
references:
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
- https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A new service was created related to RemCom on $dest$.
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1543.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/remcom_windows-system.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:System
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName="RemCom Service"
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest ImagePath ServiceName
ServiceType
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ServiceName | eq |
|