Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
ImagePath, ServiceType, StartType, computer_name, service_name, signature_id, user
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the wineventlog_system to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path
id: 429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122
version: 20
creation_date: '2022-08-26'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log System 7045
search: '`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = "*.exe" NOT (ImagePath IN ("*:\\Windows\\*", "*:\\Program File*", "*:\\Programdata\\*", "*%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft
    - https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html
finding:
    title: A service $ImagePath$ was created from a non-standard path using $ServiceName$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: ImagePath
      type: service
analytic_story:
    - PlugX
    - Qakbot
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Flax Typhoon
    - Derusbi
    - Salt Typhoon
    - Active Directory Lateral Movement
    - Snake Malware
    - Clop Ransomware
    - Crypto Stealer
    - Brute Ratel C4
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1569.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = "*.exe" NOT (ImagePath IN ("*:\\Windows\\*", "*:\\Program File*", "*:\\Programdata\\*", "*%systemroot%\\*"))

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID

Stage 3: rename

| rename Computer as dest

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ImagePathin"*%systemroot%\\*", "*:\\Program File*", "*:\\Programdata\\*", "*:\\Windows\\*"excludes:ImagePath

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 7045 corpus 21 (splunk 18, elastic 1, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7045"
ImagePatheq
  • "*.exe"
field:"ImagePath" kind:eq