Detection rules › Splunk
Windows SpeechRuntime COM Hijacking DLL Load
SpeechRuntime is vulnerable to an attack that allows a user to run code on another user's session remotely and stealthily by exploiting a Windows COM class. When this class is invoked, it launches SpeechRuntime.exe in the context of the currently logged-on user. Because this COM class is susceptible to COM Hijacking, the attacker can alter the registry remotely to point to a malicious DLL. By dropping that DLL on the target system (e.g., via SMB) and triggering the COM object, the attacker causes the malicious DLL to load into SpeechRuntime.exe and executing under the user's context. This detection identifies suspicious DLL loads by SpeechRuntime.exe from outside the expected locations.
Known false positives
- This process should normally never be loading dlls from outside the Windows system directory.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 7: Image loaded |
Rule body
name: Windows SpeechRuntime COM Hijacking DLL Load
id: bd35738c-e93a-4e4f-be24-f6a3680b950a
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-08-27'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: SpeechRuntime is vulnerable to an attack that allows a user to run code on another user's session remotely and stealthily by exploiting a Windows COM class. When this class is invoked, it launches SpeechRuntime.exe in the context of the currently logged-on user. Because this COM class is susceptible to COM Hijacking, the attacker can alter the registry remotely to point to a malicious DLL. By dropping that DLL on the target system (e.g., via SMB) and triggering the COM object, the attacker causes the malicious DLL to load into SpeechRuntime.exe and executing under the user's context. This detection identifies suspicious DLL loads by SpeechRuntime.exe from outside the expected locations.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 7
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image="*SpeechRuntime.exe"
| eval image_loaded_lower = lower(ImageLoaded)
| search NOT image_loaded_lower="*system32*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY Image ImageLoaded dest
loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name
parent_process_name parent_process_guid process_exec
process_guid process_hash process_id
process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists
service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_speechruntime_com_hijacking_dll_load_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.
known_false_positives: This process should normally never be loading dlls from outside the Windows system directory.
references:
- https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/SpeechRuntimeMove
finding:
title: Possible Lateral Movement abusing Speech Runtime on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Compromised Windows Host
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1021.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image="*SpeechRuntime.exe"
Stage 2: eval
| eval image_loaded_lower = lower(ImageLoaded)
Stage 3: search
| search NOT image_loaded_lower="*system32*"
Stage 4: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY Image ImageLoaded dest
loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name
parent_process_name parent_process_guid process_exec
process_guid process_hash process_id
process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists
service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `windows_speechruntime_com_hijacking_dll_load_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
image_loaded_lower | eq | "*system32*" | excludes:image_loaded_lower |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7" |
Image | eq |
| field:"Image" kind:eq |